of thinkers, is furnished by Alasdair McIntyre's notion of characters, the "masks worn by moral philosophies" as representative articulations of particular ethical traditions (15) .
Of the three groups, the clerical economists were the most uniformly positive in their assessment of capitalism. Though trained as ministers, these divines were primarily academics, writing extensively in the field of political economy. They viewed economics as a set of natural laws that could be neither denied nor flouted. As devout Christians, they recognized the importance of personal morality but (following Adam Smith) treated moral theology and economics as fundamentally distinct disciplines.
The contrarians, meanwhile, roundly criticized the spread of market capitalism, deploring both its economic and moral effects. Colwell believed that the teachings of Christ were irreconcilably at odds with the teachings of Adam Smith. Brownson's case was more complicated. As with any treatment of Brownson, Davenport's must contend with frequent and rapid changes of perspective and opinion. To simplify, Brownson's early attitude was more hostile toward the developing market economy; later, he abandoned his systematic socialist critique in favor of a more accommodating but still critical assessment.
The pastoral moralists were clergymen first and foremost; therefore, and unlike the clerical economists, their focus remained fixed on the moral dimensions of capitalism rather than its economy theory. They accepted the fact of the market system and recognized its good effects, but voiced qualms about its deficiencies more loudly than the clerical economists, if less vehemently than the contrarians.
Davenport's study is an outstanding contribution to the history of American intellectual life in the nineteenth century. On the critical question of the relationship between economic ideas and religion, he casts his lot with historians of the period who see theological commitments as independently interesting and of complicated genesis (notably Daniel Walker Howe), and not with those who reduce religious ideas to expressions of class conflict (notably Charles Sellers).
One weakness of the book is the author's invocation of McIntyre's characters concept. It does little damage to the narrative but neither is it clear that it is of much value. This criticism touches on historiographical issues that cannot be addressed here. Suffice it to say that this reviewer is not persuaded that the construction or application of a theoretical framework is necessary to fashioning a compelling historical narrative. Nor, frequently enough, does it clarify the picture of the people or events being portrayed. A second difficulty is the possible distortion introduced by the three rather distinctly drawn categories. This criticism is intended to be mild and sympathetic: the historian can hardly avoid creating such categories in his attempt to craft a readable account. Yet, the lines of distinction between the groups (especially between the clerical economists and the pastoral moralists) is not as bright as certain passages of the book suggest. Not all of the clerical economists entirely ignored moral questions, nor did they unequivocally endorse capitalism without any awareness of its weaknesses.
Still, Davenport gets it right in the end. He is too conscientious not to concede the complexity of the situation, and he reinserts some of the clerical economists into the discussion of the pastoral moralists. The move confuses his categories but enhances the accuracy Philosophy, History, and Methodology of Economics of the account. This final tribute to the integrity of the sources manifests Davenport's keen historical sense and indicates why this book is such a valuable contribution to our understanding of the history of Christian reflection on the market. There are many introductory texts and complicated tomes available on game theory. Most of these books seem to fit into two categories: those for popular consumption and those for persons with significant mathematical skills. The upshot of this situation is that economists and social scientists who encounter game theory on occasion either get generalized theory and overviews about experiments and evidence, or they eventually meet a barrier in the form of very sophisticated mathematics. This text attempts to bridge the gap for nongame theorists by investigating game theory through presentations of four accessible topics. Thus, the book is both introductory and sophisticated, in a manner that engages by enabling the reader to do game theory. The book is quite valuable in that it offers the social scientist familiar with game theory in general terms the opportunity to discover some of the crucial features of its methods.
-Kevin Schmiesing
The authors cut to the chase, describing the general problems of each of the four cases in a sparse but readable prose. Then, they pose each problem in game theory terms and suggest theoretic techniques to address it. The authors rely on many examples to highlight the techniques of analysis, explaining each example clearly and concisely. The reader finds the real meat of the book in the practice exercises. Located at regular intervals, they serve as vehicles for solidly confirming the insights of the techniques, while giving the reader a sense of the logic that is at the core of "thinking like a game theorist."
The techniques and exercises are arranged to increase the reader's depth of understanding in a progression that relies on helpful answers to the exercises (found in the appendix). Make no mistake, the sparse text and direct presentation are counterbalanced by challenging exercises that require patience, focus, and perseverance. The payoff is difficult to describe: I liken my reading and work on the problems to a childlike discovery of a place of wonders and adventures. This analog highlights the success of the text: readers will start in a familiar world of social science and economics-a world of a flat plain-and they will be brought into a new one of game theory-a mountain above the plain-finding the road rough and narrow but the mountaintop giving a new perspective.
The four cases are rather famous ones from great minds in the field of game theory. The first one is the matching problem driven by the observation that there are many ways to match applicants to institutions of higher learning, but there are some ways of match-
